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Abstract The illegal trade in endangered plants damages both the environment and local
communities by threatening and destroying numerous species and important natural resources.
There is very little research which systematically addresses this issue by identifying specific
opportunities for crime. This article presents the results of an interdisciplinary study which
brings together criminological and conservation science expertise to identify criminal oppor-
tunities in the illegal wild plant trade and suggest strategies in order to prevent and mitigate the
problem. Methodologically, the study adapts a crime proofing of legislation approach to the
UN Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
and is based on documentary and interview data. Situational crime prevention is used as a
framework to provide points for effective intervention.
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Introduction
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
(CITES) is the main legal framework regulating international trade in wildlife. Entering into
force in 1975, the treaty aims to ensure that international trade is not detrimental to the survival
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of the species in the wild. Any such trade should be sustainable, based on sound biological
criteria, and legal, according to appropriate and rigorous national legislation. However, endan-
gered species are also traded illegally, in contravention of CITES and its guiding principles.
Wildlife trafficking has only been given attention in criminological studies recently, despite
being the concern of conservation science for decades (Sajeva and Carimi 1994; Dobson 1996;
Regan 2004). It has been recognised that a socio-legal understanding of the illegal exploitation
and destruction of natural resources is critical to successful prevention, detection and control
(Herbig and Joubert 2006; Gibbs et al. 2010). Considerable progress has been made in using
multidisciplinary approaches that integrate diverse expertise to better address the complex
challenge of preserving natural resources (Alacs et al. 2010; Gibbs et al. 2010; Lemieux 2015;
Moreto 2016).
This study furthers this path of inquiry by using criminological approaches — those of
crime proofing of legislation (hereafter CPL) and situational crime prevention (hereafter SCP)
— to propose ways to overcome some of the challenges encountered by conservation scientists
and law enforcement officers in dealing with the illegal trade in wildlife. Specifically, the study
relies on CPL to identify criminogenic opportunities in the existing framework regulating trade
in wildlife and suggests points for intervention through a SCP approach. Given the heteroge-
neity of the criminal markets in wildlife and the necessity to be crime specific in identifying
and tackling criminal opportunities (Clarke 2012), the analysis and discussion will focus
uniquely on wild plant trafficking. After providing a brief history of international trade in
wild plants and how it is regulated under CITES, the article will present the data collection and
the analytical approaches used, and systematically identify criminogenic aspects in the CITES
regulatory framework. Finally, potential interventions to mitigate the problem will be present-
ed and discussed.
Background
A brief history of wild plant trafficking
While the illegal trade in wild animals (and animal parts, e.g. ivory) is receiving increasing
attention by both criminologists and the general public, the illegal trade in plants has so far
been relatively overlooked (with some notable exceptions, such as van Solinge 2008; Wyatt
2013, 2014). Wild plant trafficking threatens and destroys numerous species and important
natural resources (Herbig and Joubert 2006; Phelps and Webb 2015), and it hinders the rule of
law, security and good governance (UNODC 2016; Haenlein and Smith 2017).
Trade in wild plants increased in America and Europe after the Second World War. As a
result of increased disposable income, greenhouses and heating became more affordable
leading to an increase in demand for exotic plants (Sajeva and Carimi 1994; Sajeva et al.
2007). Unfortunately, the profitability of the market also boosted the trade of endangered
species: the demand for wild plants intensified the pressure on wild populations, and some taxa
(i.e. any taxonomic category, as a species or genus) such as rare species of Ariocarpus (a genus
of Mexican cacti) became virtually extinct in the wild by the end of the 1970s (Sajeva et al.
2007). This pressure on wild populations still applies to cacti and to several other plant groups
for the horticultural trade, such as orchids, cycads and carnivorous plants (Phelps and Webb
2015; Olmos-Lau and Mandujano 2016; RBG Kew 2016, 2017; Vaglica et al. 2017). The
illegal trade of wild plants is also increasingly affecting timber species traded for their desirable
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aesthetic and construction qualities, which led to the inclusion in CITES Appendix II of
several taxa — such as Dalbergia, a genus of rosewood (CoP 17 2016). Furthermore, wild
plants are illegally traded for their medical or alleged healing properties, such as a number of
aromatic plant species.
Trade over the Internet over the past two decades has led to an escalation of the problem: it
accelerated the illegal plant trade and made it a real Bhybrid^ (online and offline) market
(Lavorgna 2014). In fact, no matter how highly specialised the market in certain wild plants is,
it is much easier to find potential buyers or sellers online than in the physical world (Wu 2007;
Interpol 2013; Sajeva et al. 2013; Lavorgna 2014; Olmos-Lau and Mandujano 2016).
The regulatory framework
As noted in the Introduction, the main legal framework regulating wildlife trade is the 1975
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).1
As of early 2017, 183 countries have ratified the Convention. CITES aims to control the trade
of species in which international commercialisation and over-exploitation is a serious threat to
their survival, or could threaten survival in future if not regulated. Therefore, as clarified in its
Preamble, the main scope of the Convention is to protect biodiversity and the intrinsic cultural,
aesthetic and economic value of wild fauna and flora (Young 2003).
CITES provides three levels of protection for endangered species, depending on their level
of threat2: species listed on Appendix I are threatened with extinction and their trade in wild
specimens is permitted only in exceptional circumstances. Species included in Appendix II are
considered vulnerable and their international trade is strictly regulated; trade in wild collected
specimens is allowed but is subject to the issuance of a permit. This Appendix also includes
Blook-alike^ species that are difficult to differentiate from those threatened, although they
themselves might not be at risk of extinction. Species listed in Appendix III are protected in at
least one country, which has asked other CITES parties for assistance in controlling the trade;
trade in wild collected specimens is permitted but is subject to export permits or certificates of
origin. Each Party to the Convention must designate one or more Management Authorities in
charge of administering the licencing system and one or more Scientific Authorities to advise
them on the effects of trade on the status of the species. Public and media attention are
focussed on charismatic fauna, but the number of threatened plants is far higher: more than
30,000 taxa of plants are included in the CITES Appendices, but only about 5000 taxa of
animals.
One of the consequences of CITES has been to encourage Bartificial propagation^ of many
plants. The increase in the availability and variety of plants grown in controlled conditions
improved access to supplies of cheap, high quality, uniform and disease-free plants while
taking the pressure off wild populations (Sajeva et al. 2007). However, some plant collectors
still prefer wild collected plants because they have a Bhistory^ and better display the aspect
they have in their original habitat (Sajeva et al. 2012; RBG Kew 2017). Furthermore, some
buyers in the medicinal plant market can show preference for wild collected plants, claiming
they contain superior active ingredients (McGough et al. 2004; Sajeva et al. 2012).
1 In the EU, CITES has been implemented by Council Regulation N. 338/1997 and Commission Regulation 865/
2006. The EU Wildlife Trade Regulations, directly applicable in all Member States, go beyond the provisions of
CITES to impose stricter control over wildlife trade (Engler and Parry-Jones 2007).
2 See https://www.cites.org/eng/app/index.php and https://www.cites.org/eng/app/appendices.php for further
details.
CITES, wild plants, and opportunities for crime
While CITES has been praised overall as a good mechanism to ensure the
sustainable use of natural resources (Zimmerman 2003; Warchol 2004; Rivalan et al.
2007; Wyatt 2016), it has also been subject to a number of criticisms. Firstly, the
regulation and control of wildlife trade depends on different national environmental
policies and ethical value judgments, resulting in a lack of harmonisation of national
legislation and creating loopholes for criminal exploitation (Sand 1997; Young 2003;
Lemieux and Clarke 2009; Bowman 2013; Sollund 2015; Sollund and Maher 2015;
Maher and Sollund 2016); in particular, CITES’ approach of B(black)listing^ species
has been criticised as an inherent weakness and a legacy of poor historical under-
standings of the complexities of biodiversity (Couzens 2013). Secondly, as stated by
Sand (1997: 55) 20 years ago, CITES may have Breached its outer limits^, as the
relevance of CITES-type border controls decreases with the abolition of internal trade
borders in Bnew^ realities such as the European Union. Thirdly, there are problems
concerning the enforcement of CITES, which is not a self-executing treaty
(Zimmerman 2003; Izzo 2010; Sand 2013).3 Finally, according to the critical stand
of Sollund (2011), the legal structure provided by CITES could even legitimise
wildlife trafficking, as it regulates the trade of already endangered animals and plants
rather than banning it tout court. It could be argued that this is not the case, given
that international trade in endangered species (listed on Appendix I) is banned under
CITES except for exceptional circumstances, whereas it is allowed (under permit) for
Appendix II species, which are not yet endangered but could become so if trade is
not regulated. The criticisms, however, mainly originate from the observation of
unintended consequences in country-specific case studies; academic research has not
yet systematically analysed the legal framework in order to specifically flag poten-
tially criminogenic provisions.
Crime proofing of legislation and situational crime prevention
Criminological research has already shown that the regulations, and their implemen-
tation, governing legitimate markets might be criminogenic, creating unintended crim-
inal opportunities (Albrecht and Kilching 2002; Russell and Clarke 2006; Transcrime
2006; Dorn et al. 2007). CPL was developed as an approach to assess existing or
future opportunities for crime due to legislation and indicate potential interventions
aimed at proofing it against crime. It proved to be a valid form of risk assessment
and management, and it served in the past to provide a comprehensive scan for
criminal opportunities arising from regulations and their implementation (Russell and
Clarke 2006; Transcrime 2006). The model developed by Transcrime (2006), for
instance, was created to assess the risk of unintended consequences produced by
legislative measures, and to suggest textual changes to the legislation in order to
reduce opportunities for crime. Nevertheless, despite the evidence of the existence of
a major criminal problem, this approach has never been used to understand in a
3 However, as a mechanism of sanctions against defaulting states, there is the possibility to Bban^ a state if not
complying with CITES regulations by suspending commercial trade of all CITES listed species. This happened
to Italy in the 1990s: at that time Italy was a Party to CITES but had not implemented national legislation. The
ban stopped all import-export of CITES listed taxa and the fashion industry was among the strongest lobbies that
pushed the government to produce a sound legislation. More recently, trade sanctions were imposed on Guinea
Bissau and Liberia (https://cites.org/sites/default/files/notif/E-Notif-2016-030.pdf).
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systematic way whether and how the norms regulating wildlife trades could have an
unintended criminogenic role, or whether there are major loopholes in their imple-
mentation that are currently exploited.
Overall, criminological studies on the CPL belong to the wider group of crime opportunity
approaches, which share the idea that opportunity is a root cause of crime (Felson and Clarke
1998) and aim to reduce crimes by looking for crime patterns in specific environments (Clarke
2009: 262). The focus is thus on the situation in which crime occurs: if behaviour is seen in a
dynamic relationship with the environment, the propensity to commit crime depends upon
immediate circumstances, which have an active role in Breadying^ the (potential) criminal to
act (Wortley 1997: 74). In other words, all these approaches build on the statement that
Bopportunity makes the thief^ (Felson and Clarke 1998: v). The study of opportunity structures
has already proved beneficial in research on wildlife crimes (Wellsmith 2010; Moreto and
Clarke 2013; Lavorgna 2014; Lemieux 2014) but to the authors’ knowledge it has never been
used specifically to study CITES and wild plant crime.
Opportunity approaches are at the basis of SCP, a practical approach to crime
prevention that seeks generally to alter the immediate causes of crime by modifying
the decisions that precede the commission of a crime through five main opportunity-
reducing techniques: increasing the offender’s perceived effort, increase the risk,
reduce the rewards, reduce provocations and remove the excuses (Clarke 1992;
Cornish and Clarke 2003). More recently, Freilich and Newman (2014) expanded
the situational crime prevention approach by suggesting a sixth technique, i.e. to
provide opportunities to manipulate behaviours. In this way, a total of 30 situational
crime prevention mechanisms can now be identified (summarised in Appendix).
As already suggested in the literature, framing CPL within the SCP approach
means it is not only possible to identify unintended criminal implications in existing
legislation, but also to develop suggestions on how to mitigate it (Savona 2017): once
we have identified specific criminogenic opportunities through CPL, we can use SCP
as a reasoning tool to propose potential solutions. This study will 1) apply the CPL
approach on the CITES regulatory framework to identify criminogenic aspects regard-
ing the illegal trade in endangered plants, and 2) identify and discuss potential SCP
measures to prevent and/or mitigate such illegal trade.
Methodology
Our methodology has two complementary parts. First, CPL (based on document analysis and
email interviews with CITES representatives in 13 countries) was applied to CITES to identify
crime opportunities. Second, SCP was used as a framework to identify priorities to be
addressed by the CITES community to prevent and mitigate the illegal trade in endangered
plants.
The CPL model adopted was developed by Transcrime (2006), with adaptations. The so-
called MARC model (Transcrime 2006) was conceived to enable policy makers to evaluate
legislation in the law-making process and to suggest changes (e.g. textual changes) to reduce
the crime risk. Our revised model is used instead by multidisciplinary researchers (from
criminology and plant ecology) and practitioners from environment authorities to identify
criminogenic opportunities in the legislation and its implementation on the basis of textual
aspects of the text, document analysis, expert interviewees and case studies.
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According to the MARC model, CPL is useful when a piece of legislation follows within
certain risky indicators (initial screening).4 CITES increases the cost of legal goods (because of
its system of export permits), regulates/restricts the trade in demanded products, and provides
officials with regulatory powers— hence, it meets risky indicators no. 4, 5 and 7 (see footnote
4). At this point, the MARC model would proceed according to a specific sequence of steps.5
In our revised model, however, given that the aim was to identify specific criminal opportu-
nities to apply SCP rather than to produce recommendations for policy makers and regulators,
we merged and adapted the preliminary and extended crime risks assessments to develop a
framework to guide and systematise our identification of criminogenic elements in CITES and
its implementation. In particular, we used the Legislative Crime Threat element, which looks at
specific textual deficiencies and market vulnerabilities. In order to assess the textual deficien-
cies, the following indicators need to be considered: external consistency (i.e. the impact of the
legal act on the existing legislative framework); internal consistency (the internal organisation
of the legal act); clarity of content (the language used); enforceability (implementation
mechanisms). In order to assess the market vulnerabilities, the following indicators need to
be considered: attractiveness (which depends on profitability and the risk of detection) and
accessibility (i.e. the capacity of criminals to infiltrate a given market) (Transcrime 2006: 17ff).
For cases of trafficking of goods — also, therefore, for trafficking in wildlife — profitability
depends on the introduction of duties on legal goods, and restrictions to the production and
distribution of goods. Risk of detection depends on the transparency of the market (i.e. how
much easier it is to identify smugglers), the presence of discretionary powers of guardians and
officials, and their professionalism and experience. Finally, accessibility depends on the
requirements for market entry and the presence of background checks.
Guided by the indicators suggested in the MARC model (see Transcrime 2006 for
further details) and inspired by the analysis carried out by Morgan and Clarke (2006)
to identify risky indicators for new legislative proposals, we systematically analysed
CITES documents to make explicit the relationship between specific CITES provisions
and criminogenic mechanisms leading to unintended consequences.
The data presented in the Findings were gathered through a two-step process.
Firstly, data on textual problems and related case studies were retrieved from official
CITES documents (e.g. working and information documents from the Conferences of
the Parties, documents from the meetings of the Plant Committee and the Standing
Committee), which are available through the CITES website.6 Documents were taken
into consideration from the most recent backwards, such that relevant and recent
4 The indicators are: 1) Legislation that induces product disposal regulations or any other new or burdensome fee
or obligation; 2) Legislation that introduces a concession on a tax or a concession on any other fee or obligation;
3) Legislation that introduces grant, subsidy or compensation scheme or any other scheme that provides a benefit;
4) Legislation that introduces or increases the tax on legal goods or in any other way increases the cost of legal
goods; 5) Legislation that prohibits or restricts a demanded product or service or in any other way decreases the
availability of demanded goods or services; 6) Legislation that introduces or removes a law enforcement capacity,
increases or decreases funding for enforcement activity or in any other way impacts the intensity of law
enforcement activity; 7) Legislation that provides officials with regulatory powers (Transcrime 2006: 3).
5 Preliminary crime risk assessment (a descriptive activity where the formal aspects of legislation are roughly
assessed, and the vulnerability of the market and the crime risks are estimated to draw broad conclusions in terms
of crime risks); extended crime risk assessment (a quantitative assessment of unintended criminal implications to
calculate the Legislative Crime Risk Index, which is the result of the Legislative Crime Threat Index and the
Seriousness Index); conclusions and recommendations.
6 https://www.cites.org/
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unintended consequences and examples were found. These data were integrated with
critiques to the CITES text in known previous academic literature and other docu-
mentary sources (e.g. official reports and recommendations from NGOs). This initial
scan allowed us to have a first overview of the CITES weaknesses as already
identified in existing documentary sources. Thematic coding was carried out manually.
Secondly, we carried out structured interviews with representatives of CITES
Management and/or Scientific Authorities of 13 countries. The researchers contacted
via email potential respondents from a total of 76 countries: specifically, the 28
Members States of the European Union, the remaining 21 states of the European
Region as main importer countries of wild plants, and an additional 27 states,
distributed in all the other continents, that are major traders and countries of origin
of the two exotic taxa of plants mostly traded into Western markets (cacti and
orchids). The sampling was partially limited by pre-existing contacts between the
selected countries and members of the research team, which facilitated the email
exchange; further research could expand our study to other countries. Respondents
from the following 13 countries participated in the study: Australia, Austria, Estonia,
Finland, Honduras, Italy, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mexico, Myanmar, Namibia, Turkey
and Vietnam (for a total of 17 respondents; more than one person replied in some
countries). Email interviewing (carried out in March 2017) allowed the researchers to
include geographically dispersed respondents, who would have been otherwise diffi-
cult to access (McCoyd and Kerson 2006; O’Connor and Madge 2017). We asked our
respondents open-ended questions focusing on whether they encountered specific
problems in CITES framing and implementation in the course of their duties, and
on potential solutions and best practices. We asked our respondents to provide specific
examples whenever possible. As before, the answers were thematically analysed
through manual coding. The respondents have been anonymised in the Findings.
Findings
Criminogenic opportunities: results
This section presents the results of our analyses of CITES documents and CITES implemen-
tation. It identifies criminogenic opportunities by pointing out specific CITES provisions and
loopholes that give rise to unintended consequences, and the vulnerability indicator as
presented in the MARC model (Transcrime 2006, see above). Specific examples are provided
whenever available.
CITES provision & risky element: Preamble. It equates Baesthetic, scientific, cultural,
recreational and economic^ reasons for defending wildlife.
Intended consequences: Allows flexibility in the Parties’ interpretation of which method is
preferable to achieve wildlife protection.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: Can create confusion, as the text allows for both
preservationist and conservationist interpretations (Young 2003). Preservationism is the idea
that nature has an intrinsic value and that humans should make as little changes as possible to
it. Conservationism is the idea that natural resources have an instrumental value and should be
wisely managed by humans to maximise the benefits they can offer.
Indicator: clarity of content.
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CITES provision & risky element: Art.1 (Definitions) Defines Bspecies^ as Bany species,
subspecies, or geographically separate population thereof^ (art.1a).
Intended consequences: Enables a country to protect its own wildlife from potential
extinction in that country, regardless of the species’ abundance elsewhere.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: (1) Can create confusion, as a certain species
might be abundant in one country and endangered in another (Meyers and Seligsohn Bennet
1989; Young 2003); (2) Problems encountered with the discovery and identification of new
species. For instance, recently newly described taxa of Mexican cacti were found online within
months of their discovery, with increasing numbers of collectors looking for the newest species
(European Regional CITES Plants Meeting 2014).
Indicator: clarity of content; attractiveness; accessibility.
CITES provision & risky element: Art.1 (Definitions) Specimens and their derivatives have
to be Breadily recognisable^ (art.1b).
Intended consequences: Facilitates management in the CITES implementation.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: (1) Creates a loophole, as Breadily
recognisable^ is not well defined (Meyers and Seligsohn Bennet 1989; Gillespie 2011).
The identification of exotic timber and derivatives (figures, musical instruments etc.) is
particularly complicated (e.g. Buddha figures from Thailand and Cambodia) (Respondent
B); (2) New problems arise as companies and individuals are producing Bbioengineered^
products which look, feel and taste as real wildlife products (CoP17 Inf.22); (3) When
plants and their derivatives are used as medicines, supplements and cosmetics, they are
sometimes traded without CITES paperwork (many of these incidents appear to be the
result of ignorance or negligence, not criminal intent) (UNODC 2016). For instance,
cases of orchid derivatives (Meeting of the Enforcement Group 2015; RBG Kew 2016);
aloe, cacti, sandalwood etc. (European Regional CITES Plants Meeting 2014;
Respondents B, E).
Indicator: clarity of content; external consistency; enforceability; accessibility.
CITES provision & risky element: Arts. 3, 4 & 5 (Regulation […] Appendixes I, II & III)
No advice of Scientific Authority is needed for re-export certificate (art. 3(4) & art.4(5)).
Intended consequences: Allow the commercial sustainable use of species even if listed in
the Appendixes.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: Annotations to listed species (annotation
4(b)7 calls for Bseedling or tissue cultures […] transported in sterile containers^).
However, after the plant is removed from the container, it is difficult to determine the
artificially propagated origin because of lack of documentation. This occurs when more
than one authority is involved (e.g. in the EU) (Respondent A). For instance, orchids
might arrive to one country in a sterile container. After they are removed from the
container, they are transported elsewhere and sold. At this point, there is no longer
CITES documentation and it is impossible to prove an illegal import (Respondent A).
Indicator: enforceability; attractiveness.
CITES provision & risky element: Arts. 3, 4 & 5 (Regulation […] Appendixes I, II & III).
BA Management Authority of the State of export is satisfied that the specimen was not
obtained in contravention of the laws of that State for the protection of fauna and flora^ (art.
3(2b), 4(2b) & 5(2a)).
7 https://cites.org/eng/resources/pub/checklist08/Checklist.pdf
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Intended consequences: Ensure trade is legally sourced in accordance with national legis-
lation. CITES provides a framework respected by each Party, which must adopt their own
domestic legislation to implement CITES at the national level.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: (1) The Convention does not provide guidance on
how tomake a so-called Legal Acquisition Finding (certifying that the specimenwas not obtained in
contravention of national legislation). It is the obligation of an applicant for an export permit to
provide information that will satisfy the Management Authority that the relevant specimens were
legally acquired. The Convention places considerable responsibility upon the CITES Management
Authorities of the State of export to ensure that specimens of listed species entering international
trade are of legal origin and exported at sustainable levels.8 Unfortunately, when a recommendation
is made to suspend trade in a specific species from one country, there may be increased legal and
illegal exports of the species from neighbouring or third countries. In the case of illegal trade, this
increase could be an indication of well organised transnational smuggling combinedwith a failure to
properly determine legal acquisition. If such failures become systematic, they provide unscrupulous
traders with the opportunity to Blaunder^ illegally-obtained specimens (plants and animals) into the
international market under the cover of genuine CITES permits through neighbouring countries.
(CoP17 Doc. 23)9; (2) Can create random exemptions. For instance, Bregarding Madagascar’s
implementation of CITES listings for plant species, the [Plants] Committee requested that the
Secretariat seek clarification fromMadagascar concerning a policy which apparently allows tourists
to export (up to) five specimens of CITES-listed plants without CITES permits or certificates^
(CoP17 Doc 10.3.1); (3) No common standards are provided. Annotations can be very different
among countries (Respondent K). The interpretation of annotations varies considerably between
Parties, and the lack of a common understanding creates considerable challenges in implementing
the Convention, particularly for plants.
Indicator: internal consistency; clarity of content.
CITES provision & risky element: Art.4 The Scientific Authority Bshall advise^ the Manage-
ment Authority of Bsuitable measures to be taken to limit the grant of export limits^ (art.4(3)).
Intended consequences: Ensures that endangered species are subject to a stricter system of
controls.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: (1) In the implementation stage, often a man-
agement plan is requested for each species. However, in many countries there are no funds for
these studies and this can become very critical in countries with high numbers of listed species,
such as Madagascar (Respondent E); (2) NDFs10 (Non Detriment Findings are poorly
8 Regarding the designation and role of the Scientific Authorities, Resolution Conf. 10.3 (CoP 10,
https://www.cites.org/eng/res/10/10-03C15.php) recommends that Ball Parties designate Scientific Authorities
independent from Management Authorities^ (art. 3(2a) Res Conf. 10.3) in order to prevent corruption and to
foster independent scientific advice. Unfortunately, this is not always the case (e.g. in some countries both the
Scientific and the Management Authorities are part of the Ministry of the Environment (see https://cites.
org/eng/cms/index.php/component/cp).
9 This is relevant also to Art.8.
10 The preamble to the Convention recognises that the protection of certain species of wild flora against over-
exploitation through international trade is essential. However, the point at which such over-exploitation starts has
never been defined by the Parties. Terms used in the text of the Convention such as Bthreatened with extinction^
and Butilisation incompatible with their survival^ (art.2) in relation to inclusion of species in the Appendices have
been defined through the adoption of Resolution Conf. 9.24 (Rev. CoP16) on Criteria for amendment of
Appendices I and II. However, related concepts linked with the issuance of permits (art.3 and 4) have been little
clarified by the Parties. These have become collectively known as the Bnon-detriment findings^ (NDFs).
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managed, there is lack of information to formulate them properly). Also, most NDFs are done
after the harvest, while they should be made before (Respondent G).
Indicator: enforceability.
CITES provision & risky element: Art.6 (Permits and certificates). Any copies of a permit or
certificate issued by a Management Authority shall be clearly marked as copies only and no
such copy may be used in place of the original, except to the extent endorsed thereon (art.6(4)).
Management Authorities have to affix a Bmark^ on specimen to assist in their identification.
The Bmark^ has to be Bdesigned in such a way as to render its imitation by unauthorised
persons as difficult as possible^ (art.6(7)).11
Intended consequences: A licencing system is in place for all import, export, re-export and
introduction from the sea of species covered by the CITES.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: (1) The article does not provide provisions to
share information on permits and certificate among the Parties12; (2) The Scientific Authority
might have to establish plant ID techniques of high numbers of species. While technically
feasible, this can be a challenge for the lack of funding and international cooperation. E.g.,
cases of wood ID techniques for Dalbergia and Diospyros (Respondent E); cases regarding
timber (Respondent G). Moreover, this requirement does not align well with electronic, risk
based border clearance processes— and there is a move towards e-permitting (CoP17 Doc. 44
(Rev. 1)); (3) Paperwork can be forged (Respondent J). E.g, over 100 cases where Siamese
rosewood was seized in Thailand over the years due to misdeclaration of species (UNODC
2016); (4) There is no regulation on how to treat individual specimen imported under a certain
purpose code,13 in particular if there is a change of purpose in case of re-export (Respondent
A). E.g., shipments of artificially propagated specimens have been imported legally from Peru
under phytosanitary rules, however closer inspection has revealed the specimens were wild-
collected (Meeting of the Enforcement Group 2013). E.g., someone from a third country
imported a plant under the code Bscientific^ and then exported artificially propagated plants as
Bcommercial^ to the EU. The case does not seem to be isolated and this modus operandi is
likely to affect highly endangered species (Respondent A). In a hypothetical example, a high
value orchid species like Paphiopedilum rothschildianummight be imported with all necessary
documentation. The same documentation might be used to legalise illegal individuals of the
same species (Respondent A). Also, reported cases of orchids and succulent species (Respon-
dent E); (5) Due to the nature of plants, there is no tradition of keeping track of individual
plants (as it occurs in the case of animals). Therefore, it is relatively easy to use the same
documents for different plants (Respondent A); (6) Airlines often do not require the mandatory
documentation, which facilitates illegal importers (Respondent D); (7) Traders can withhold
information, e.g. on location and nomenclature (Respondent E); (8) Entirely avoiding control
11 In order to prevent fraudulent permits, Resolution Conf. 12.3 (Rev. CoP16), paragraph XIV f) recommends
that: BExport permits and re-export certificates be endorsed, with quantity, signature and stamp, by an inspecting
official, such as Customs.
12 However, the United Nations Environment Programme’s World Conservation Monitoring Centre (UNEP-
WCMC) is developing a mechanism to facilitate the electronic exchange or verification of CITES-Permit data
among Management Authorities. The tool, known as EPIX (Electronic Permit Information eXchange), is being
developed so that participating Management Authorities can exchange data regardless of the type of information-
management system used by each Authority. This mechanism is being developed in communication with the
CITES e-permitting working group which is developing standards for data electronic exchange (see https://cites.
org/eng/prog/e/e-permitting-toolkit.php).
13 That is, a letter used on CITES permits and certificates to indicate the purpose of trade in the specimen covered
therein (e.g. commercial, botanic garden, etc.).
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by sending plants in shipments where they will not be found (no permits involved). E.g., in
Guatemala, illegal trade in rosewood logs were found to be hidden in shipments recorded to be
exporting recycling material (such as cardboard, junk or scrap metal) or other non-protected
timber species (Vaglica 2016).
Indicator: external consistency; internal consistency; enforceability; accessibility.
CITES provision & risky element: Art.7 (Exemptions) Exemptions for: personal or house-
hold effect; for artificially-propagated specimens or their derivatives; for specimens taken from
the wild before they become listed; donation or exchange between scientific institutions or
plant exhibitions (Art.7(2–6)).
Intended consequences: In order to facilitate the cross-border movement of endangered
species under specific circumstances, if one of these exceptions applies, no permits or
certificate are needed.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: (1) Possible fraudulent claim of one of these
exceptions. At times, it is very complicated to determine whether the exemption applies
(especially for certain species); certificates (e.g. of artificial propagation) can be forged
(Young 2003; Respondent A). Consider, for instance: BWe do have commonly artificially
propagated species in trade that are highly endangered in the wild. There are reliable
provisions for orchids, but in the case of cacti there is no reliable trade form like orchids in
a flask. If someone manages to smuggle an Astrophytum asterias from the wild to Thailand, I
will not find it ever again^ (Respondent A); (2) There are increasing numbers of plants from
legacies of deceased collectors on the market. It is very difficult to verify their origin/legality at
all (Respondent A).
Indicator: clarity of content; accessibility.
CITES provision & risky element: Art.8 (Measures to be taken by the Parties) The Parties
shall take Bappropriate measures^ to enforce the Convention, which include Bto penalize trade
in, or possession of^ prohibit specimens (Art.8(1a)). The Parties shall maintain records of trade
in specimen [….] (Art.8(6)).
Intended consequences: CITES provides a framework respected by each Party, which must
adopt their own domestic legislation to implement CITES at the national level.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: (1) CITES does not require these violations to
be deemed a crime (e.g. they might be punished with a fine) and there is no threshold for
penalisation (UNODC 2016); (2) The effectiveness of the treaty depends on whether the
Parties implement relevant provisions within their borders. Enforcement has often proved to be
ineffective. Developing countries might willingly not enforce. E.g., TRAFFIC experiment
(Cacti listed in CITES Appendices were transported across 10 countries; only the US and ex-
USSR confiscated the cacti, but for health issues and not because of CITES) (Meyers and
Seligsohn Bennet 1989; Young 2003); (3) Potentially illegally sourced plants might enter the
legal supply chain before export, and then be freely traded internationally (the Blaundering^
can take place before CITES applies). E.g., as CITES controls were placed on rosewood,
traders began to rapidly extract those species that were not listed. Source countries tried to put
their own controls in place, but without CITES, most countries cannot legally reject a shipment
of rosewood simply because it was illegally harvested or exported, as they lack in their
domestic law instruments for acknowledging the wildlife regulations of other countries
(UNODC 2016); (4) Some parties lack adequate resources/training for effective enforcement
(Young 2003; Respondent E). E.g., in the case of agarwood the product can assume forms of
which law enforcement is unaware (UNODC 2016); (5) Increasing problems with Internet-
facilitated trade where species can be traded bypassing controls, small-scale postal shipments
CITES, wild plants, and opportunities for crime
and small-scale illegal trade concealed in travellers’ luggage. E.g., operation BAttila^
concerning live plants from Chile to Italy confiscated in airports and postal shipments
(Respondent K); Mexican cacti found online within months of their discovery (European
Regional CITES Plants Meeting 2014); (6) Difficulties in reporting all trade in artificially
propagated plants, especially if there are not proper schemes to register nurseries (European
Regional CITES Plants Meeting 2014). E.g., cases for orchids and succulents (Respondent E).
Indicator: external consistency; enforceability; accessibility.
CITES provision & risky element: Art.11 (Conference of the Parties) & art.15 (Amendments
to Appendices I and II) BThe Secretariat shall convene regular meetings at least once every two
years^ for the Parties to Bconsider and adopt amendments to Appendices I and II in accordance
with Article 15^.
Intended consequences: A timeframe for meetings is provided.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: This is the only time the Appendices can be
amended (other than the rarely used postal vote/exceptional meeting) and if an annotation
needs changing or a new species listed, it is sometimes too late (e.g. for Dalbergia
cochinchinensis) (EIA 2016). In addition, Conferences of the Parties (CoPs) often occur every
3 years rather than every two, which could provide an even longer time window that may
exacerbate known problems.
Indicator: attractiveness.
CITES provision & risky element: Arts.15(3); 16(2); 23. Reservations.
Intended consequences: A reservation is a unilateral statement by a Party to not be bound
by the CITES provisions for a species listing. This introduces an element of flexibility and can
promote international cooperation.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: An export permit is required if the Party with a
reservation exports to a Party that has not taken out a reservation on the same species (RBG
Kew 2016). E.g., Reported cases of Japan and ex-URSS countries importing endangered
wildlife (Young 2003); E.g., Hong Kong has not implemented CoP16 timber listings in the
legislation and has become a black hole for laundering Malagasy palisander and rosewood
(European Regional CITES Plants Meeting 2014).
Indicator: External consistency; accessibility.
CITES provision & risky element: Art.18 (Resolution of disputes).
Intended consequences: In order to preserve state sovereignty, a system of central cooper-
ation is not imposed.
Unintended consequences and mechanism: Enforcement problems due to the lack of any
central enforcement entity. Party compliance relies on persuasive means (Young 2003).
Indicator: Enforceability.
Criminogenic opportunities: discussion
The previous section provided a systematic overview of current vulnerabilities in CITES
and its implementation. It showed how a regulation, and its implementation, governing a
legitimate market can have vulnerabilities and consequently create unintended criminal
opportunities, consistent with previous research (Morgan and Clarke 2006; Transcrime
2006). Our results suggest that CPL remains a valid tool to assist the assessment of
regulatory frameworks, and proves to be useful well beyond criminological and legal
studies (in our case, conservation science) to guide an expert-led identification of
unintended criminogenic factors.
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It is worth noting that three respondents (D, G, and H) denied the existence of specific
problems with CITES (which is Bpretty straightforward in its provision^, Respondent G), even
if two of them (D and G) identified specific problems in its implementation. In addition,
Respondent C replied that his/her country did not have seizures of illegal plants or knowledge
of trafficking routes, nor in fact much legal trade in CITES plants either. However, considering
recent research on CITES noncompliance and on dark numbers in the trade of endangered
plants (Vézina 2015; Hinsley et al. 2016; Olmos-Lau and Mandujano 2016), illegal aspects of
the trade might simply be occurring under the radar of law enforcement in certain countries.
More research to estimate the dark numbers of wild plant trafficking is certainly needed.
While the previous section followed the order of CITES provisions to identify existing
problems, some of the criminogenic opportunities are recurrent and can be best summarised in
the following list:
ambiguity in the terminology and definitions used;
time gap between the discovery of new species (potentially endangered) and their listings
in the Appendices;
difficulties in recognising derivative products;
loopholes in the paper trail of plants and derivatives in cases of re-export;
lack of financial/scientific/legal/administrative resources in certain countries;
lack of monitoring and enforcement of Internet-facilitated trades;
documents can be easily forged and information easily withheld or presented in a
misleading way by importers and/or traders;
difficulties in cross-border relationships.
Overall, all the indicators developed in the MARC model in the Legislative Crime Threat
element were identified in CITES, with a prevalence of external consistency, clarity of content,
enforceability and accessibility problems. It is therefore on these aspects that the SCP analysis
will focus.
Opportunities that are inherently linked to CITES raison d’être, such as the fact that the
Convention itself does not provide for enforcement mechanisms in the case of noncompliance,
are not covered in the following sections as they depend on high-level national and interna-
tional policymaking and therefore exceed the scope of this study.
Prevention mechanisms: results
Having identified specific crime opportunities, we now want to see whether and to what extent
SCP can provide proper guidance to mitigate these problems. From our analysis, the following
SCP techniques and mechanisms (see Appendix A for the complete list) could be particularly
useful to guide stakeholders and policy-makers in order to mitigate wild plant trafficking.
Traditional Bincrease the effort^ SCP mechanisms such as target hardening (e.g. packaging
requirements in case of re-export), control access to facilities (e.g. systematic baggage
screening) and screen exit (e.g. forgery-proof documents) could certainly help mitigate
problems linked to loopholes in the paper trails in cases of re-export and forged documents.
For instance, a specific target hardening mechanism suggested by Respondent A is the
implementation of additional documentation (at least on a voluntary basis) of material
imported under Annotation 4b (Bseedling or tissue cultures obtained in vitro, in solid or liquid
media, transported in sterile containers^), or plants resulting from such imports. Improved
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customs procedures could help. Unfortunately, as noted by Respondent A, these types of
solutions would be unrealistic unless countries are more open towards giving each other access
to customs databases.
Similarly, Bincrease the risk^ mechanisms such as reducing anonymity (e.g. use of plant
IDs), utilising place managers (e.g. reward vigilance by legitimate plant dealers), and strength-
ening formal surveillance (e.g. more and better trained customs control officers) could play an
important role. For instance, Respondent D recognised the importance of capacity-building
programmes for Scientific Authorities and law enforcement bodies (especially customs offi-
cials). According to Respondent K, Bit is [also] necessary to increase control activities, also at
local level to give a clear signal of punishment^. Respondent B stressed the need to have better
training on the CITES framework for law enforcement agencies, and access to a CITES expert
list to rely on whenever needed. Respondent A recommended marking individual plants in a
similar way to that in place for individual animals, but the respondent also recognised that
Bthere are difficulties to solve before this is viable^. Respondent G suggested the need to
finance research to generate intelligence on the main traded species, to better focus law
enforcement attention.
Also Breduce the rewards^ mechanisms could provide guidance for effective intervention.
Specifically, Bdisrupt markets^ is helpful in stressing the importance of monitoring online ads
and sales, especially given that Internet trade appears to be frequently overlooked by law
enforcement agencies (Hinsley et al. 2016); Bidentify properties^ suggests efforts should be
made to systematically record trade data for both listed and non-listed species at regional/
national levels. Otherwise, Scientific Authorities have no access to information on individual
plants before export, making it difficult to determine whether they are of artificially propagated
or wild origin (as suggested by Respondent E). BDeny benefits^ is a useful reminder that in
countries with high levels of corruption, specific policies need to be put in place to mitigate
illegal trades of endangered plants. For instance, as reported by Respondent E:
BPlant species suffer of attention deficit from politicians and rulers because of low
market value (except rosewood, palisander and ebony for which an anti-corruption
criminal chain was established). The challenge is to extend this chain to any natural
resources crime. [...] It is necessary to build capacities of customs on specimen ID but
that is not enough if not supported by national effort to curb corruption within
administration officers^.
However, to properly implement all the above-mentioned approaches might involve sig-
nificant additional resources, which are likely to clash with financial constraints. Hence, from a
practical perspective, other SCP mechanisms might be more promising in tackling wild plants
trafficking as they would require more limited resources.
Of particular interest are Bremove excuse^ mechanisms, such as Bset rules^ (e.g. as
suggested by Respondent A, putting in place stricter guidelines for purpose codes to change;
ensure proper implementation of national laws; as suggested by Respondent K, agreeing on
internationally approved standards and interpretation in CITES application, e.g. in parts that
are exempted by CITES provisions), Bpost instructions^ and Balert conscience^ (e.g. to display
reminders of CITES requirements on airports, to flag up a CITES advert whenever someone
looks to be buying a threatened species online, to request signatures for custom declarations for
tourists travelling from at-risk exporting countries), and Bassist compliance^ (e.g. ensuring
easy access to information for legal exports, for instance through travel agencies for tourists
travelling towards at-risk exporting countries or on websites dedicated to horticulture; having
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adequate schemes to register nurseries at the national level). Vaglica et al. (2017), for instance,
recently identified a potential way in which shoppers online could be notified if it was
predicted with high probability that they were likely to want to shop for species requiring
CITES controls. As suggested by Respondent E, these approaches would also develop better
and more open relationships with legitimate traders, which would be very important as those
are the ones with Bdense network [of relationships] with botanists and plant lovers over the
world and [have] premium information on [at-risk] species^.
Finally, Bprovide opportunities^ mechanisms (to facilitate compliance with CITES) are also
promising. In order to tackle wild plant trafficking, they can translate into improving aware-
ness in both the offer and the demand sides, in both the local communities harvesting
endangered plants and end-buyers (Bit’s necessary to inform more collectors on their respon-
sibility and increase the sensibility of people on conservation problems^, Respondent K).
Local communities should be made more aware of the problems connected with wild plants
being smuggled illegally (Respondent H), but in order for this to work alternative profit-
making opportunities need to be offered (Boffer alternatives^ technique). Some countries are
already trying to move in this direction, which can be considered a best practice to be
implemented elsewhere. Consider for instance the following answer provided by Respondent
G:
BWe need to establish practical alternatives for communities that depend on CITES
species. To put a concrete example, all timber harvest of Dalbergia is from the wild, and
[Country G] should be paving the way towards the establishment of commercial
plantations (that include in their management plan, in situ conservation activities of
the wild populations). We are currently working on this, in close collaboration with the
local communities that will benefit from these responsible and sustainable practices
(including agroforestal schemes, specifically with coffee plantations)^.
At the same time, buyers should be made more aware and responsible, especially regarding
endangered plants (such as cacti and orchids) which are illegally traded for private collectors,
as well as for food and medicine.
Last but not least, to facilitate compliance with CITES more effective international coop-
eration is essential. Respondent D, for instance, noted the importance on maintaining institu-
tional coordination and good communication with other CITES Parties. However, cooperation
for certain countries can be jeopardised not only by the lack of political and institutional will,
but also by more mundane issues. Respondent I (from a country heavily affected by illegal
trade, to the point that he/she stressed how in his/her country is becoming increasingly difficult
to see critical species — such as the orchid Paphiopedilum — in the wild) emphasised how
Bthe CITES platform [works] mainly for native English speaker and big countries. The
language is a major barrier for other country[ies] [to] participate^. This type of practical
obstacle to international cooperation necessitates addressing an open cross-border dialogue as
a matter of priority.
Prevention mechanisms: discussion
Here we have demonstrated the utility of the SCP framework as an analytical method for
mapping and devising effective interventions. The SCP framework has been continually
refined and extended since its inception (Newman and Freilich 2012), originally being mainly
applied to more conventional, high-volume crimes (such as burglary). Our results extend the
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development of the SCP, showing how a situational approach could be particularly beneficial
in a domain — such as the one in wildlife crimes, and specifically wildlife trafficking —
characterised by scarce and poorly resourced policing (Nurse 2011; CITES 2016; Runhovde
2016). In fact, SCP can provide a wide array of potential solutions to draw from, depending on
economic (or even political) feasibility.
Second, it should be noted that, while many of the SCP mechanisms presented above have
been thought specifically to mitigate and prevent the illegal trade in endangered plants, they
might also provide a guide for other types of wildlife crimes in which comparable modus
operandi are in place (e.g. wild animal trafficking). Furthermore, these mechanisms could
have a positive spillover effect — or Bdiffusion of benefits^, in the SCP jargon (Clarke and
Weisburd 1994) — towards the prevention of other criminal activities: for instance, better
mechanisms to monitor online ads and sales could help prevent online frauds; improving
access by tourists to information for legal exports could help prevent some illegal trade in
cultural artefacts; increasing plant collectors’ awareness could help prevent illegal harvesting.
Respondent E reported cases of buyers requiring specimens with particular features and sizes
that can be found only from the wild, a behaviour that promotes illegal harvesting (beyond
trafficking).
Finally, our success in applying the SCP framework to international plant trafficking
suggests similar gains may be made by applying the framework to other conservation
legislation. Other national or international species or habitat protection legislation would be
natural targets, such as the common fisheries policy.
Conclusion
This study brought together criminological and conservation science expertise to systemati-
cally identify vulnerabilities in the legal framework of CITES and its implementation. It
suggested and discussed potential strategies in order to prevent and mitigate the problem.
Despite the limits and critical points raised in this paper, CITES remains the most powerful
international convention on biodiversity conservation. The possibility to monitor trade in
endangered species and impose automatic sanctions to the non-complying parties creates a
powerful tool to prevent or at least mitigate illegal trade in endangered species. Allowing the
CITES Secretariat to evaluate how Parties’ legislations permit the implementation of the
Convention (Morgera et al. 2014), recommending the suspension of trade in CITES species
for those not complying with adequate legislation, further enhances the strength of CITES.
As recognised in the latest UNODC report (2016: 96), Blegislation can go some way toward
enhancing the profile of wildlife crime, but law enforcement prioritization is the decisive
factor .^ Unfortunately, the enhancement of law enforcement operational capacity requires
resources that might not always be on the table for CITES Parties in source, transit and
destination countries. If scarce resources have to be effectively allocated, a crime opportunity
approach and SCP framework prove to be good reasoning tools to map problems and discuss
potential solutions.
For instance, extra resources could be channelled towards the monitoring of online markets,
ad-hoc training, and to develop forgery-proof documents. Further research to identify crime
clusters in online and offline markets — Bhot products^, Bhotspots^, Brisky facilities^ etc. in
the crime opportunity lexicon (Farrell 2015) — would certainly be of great utility in better
allocating resources. The importance of independent scientific research on CITES-related
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issues and priorities has also been underlined in the European Regional CITES Plants Meeting
(2014). Similarly, progress in chemical and forensic tools can help to develop cost-effective
techniques to identify specific species and help enforcement of listings. For instance, as
reported by RBG Kew (2016: 66), a chemical compound (Bdalnigrin^) unique to Brazilian
rosewood (Dalbergia nigra) was recently discovered; it has great potential as an identification
tool to determine illegal trade in this specific timber.
Potential non-law enforcement/forensics based (and possibly Bcheaper^) solutions also
emerge from our analysis. The fact that educating tourists and locals on the importance of
wildlife resources may slow down the volume of illegal trade has long been advocated for wild
animals (Meyers and Seligsohn Bennet 1989:106). These efforts need to be extended to protect
wild plants. While it can be difficult to change cultural factors, situational techniques could
start to make a difference: Bpost instructions^ and Balert conscience^ mechanisms can be
particularly easy to implement and might be particularly valuable in addressing the maze of
online trade. In fact, traditional law enforcement does not translate well to cyberspace (Wall
2007), so that self-help and education become the first line of defence against online crimes
(Brenner 2007).
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